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Abstract It is a frequent assumption that—via superluminal information transfers—
superluminal signals capable of enabling communication are necessarily exchanged
in any quantum theory that posits hidden superluminal influences. However, does
the presence of hidden superluminal influences automatically imply superluminal
signalling and communication? The non-signalling theorem mediates the apparent
conflict between quantum mechanics and the theory of special relativity. However, as
a ‘no-go’ theorem there exist two opposing interpretations of the non-signalling con-
straint: foundational and operational. Concerning Bell’s theorem, we argue that Bell
employed both interpretations, and that he finally adopted the operational position
which is associated often with ontological quantum theory, e.g., de Broglie–Bohm
theory. This position we refer to as “effective non-signalling”. By contrast, associated
with orthodox quantum mechanics is the foundational position referred to here as
“axiomatic non-signalling”. In search of a decisive communication-theoretic criterion
for differentiating between “axiomatic” and “effective” non-signalling, we employ
the operational framework offered by Shannon’s mathematical theory of communica-
tion, whereby we distinguish between Shannon signals and non-Shannon signals. We
find that an effective non-signalling theorem represents two sub-theorems: (1) Non-
transfer-control (NTC) theorem, and (2) Non-signification-control (NSC) theorem.
Employing NTC and NSC theorems, we report that effective, instead of axiomatic,
non-signalling is entirely sufficient for prohibiting nonlocal communication. Effective
non-signalling prevents the instantaneous, i.e., superluminal, transfer of message-
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encoded information through the controlled use—by a sender-receiver pair —of
informationally-correlated detection events, e.g., in EPR-type experiments. An effec-
tive non-signalling theorem allows for nonlocal quantum information transfer yet—at
the same time—effectively denies superluminal signalling and communication.
Keywords Quantum nonlocality · Superluminal signalling · Shannon communica-
tion theory · De Broglie–Bohm theory · Bell’s theorem
1 Introduction
Bell’s theorem proved that no quantum theory based on the joint assumptions of
“causality and locality” can successfully reproduce the predictions that are yielded by
orthodox quantum mechanics [1]. Consequently, for the case of EPR-type nonlocal
correlations at space-like distances, Bell’s proof implies that the correlations are either
(1) beyond physical explanation, at least in locally causal terms, or alternatively (2) the
correlations might be explained by physical processes that are, for example, governed
by nonlocal, i.e., superluminal, causal influences. John Bell himself was dissatisfied
with the first option of no explanation and famously remarked “that correlations cry
out for explanation” [2]. Bell’s own pursuit of possible causal explanations in quantum
mechanics was reviewed by Norsen [3] whose analysis confirmed that “Bell uses the
term ‘causality’. . . to highlight that a violation of this [local causality] condition (by
some theory) means that the theory posits non-local causal influences, as opposed to
mere ‘non-local correlations’.” However, if one were to take seriously the explana-
tory option that “causal influences do go faster than light”, then—Bell [2] noted—one
should find disturbing “the impossibility of ‘messages’ faster than light, which follows
from ordinary relativistic quantum mechanics. . .”. He concluded that, therefore, for
anyone proposing an approach to quantummechanics based on nonlocal, i.e., superlu-
minal, influences, the “exact elucidation of concepts like ‘message’ and ‘we’ . . .would
be a formidable challenge” [2]. As we will discuss at length further below, Bell here
refers to the special, and still incompletely understood, ‘role of us’—human observers
and of epistemic agents in general—both in the performance of quantum-based exper-
iments and in possible definitions of the non-signalling constraint (e.g., [4]).
Despite these challenges, Bell shared an ongoing interest in de Broglie–Bohm
theory even long after publishing his seminal proof (e.g., [5–8]). David Bohm’s non-
standard formulation of quantum mechanics is well known for positing nonlocally-
causal influences as a fundamental, ontic feature of physical reality [9,10]. “This
picture, and indeed, I think, any sharp formulation of quantum mechanics”, Bell
explained in reference to Bohm’s theory, “has a very surprising feature: the conse-
quences of events at one place propagate to other places faster than light. This happens
in a way that we cannot use for signalling” [7]. The impossibility to signal by way of
superluminal influences Bell took to be the central issue for any explanatory, causal
approaches to quantum mechanics [7]: “For me then this is the real problem with
quantum theory: the apparently essential conflict between any sharp formulation and
fundamental relativity.” The fact that—50 years after Bell’s theorem— this conflict
remains unresolved would likely not have surprised Bell who had predicted decades
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ago [7]: “It may be that a real synthesis of quantum and relativity theories requires not
just technical developments but radical conceptual renewal.”
The present work offers a communication-theoretic analysis of the conceptual
impasse that exists between (1) the possibility of superluminal influences and (2)
the impossibility of superluminal signalling as required by special relativity: Does the
presence of superluminal influences necessarily imply superluminal signalling and
communication? We will present an answer based on an informational approach in
reference to Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication [11,12]. Specifically,
the present work introduces a conceptual framework for defining, in a technically
consistent manner, the difference between signalling, information transfer, and mes-
sage communication. These concepts are sometimes used interchangeably and often
without clear definition in the literature on quantum foundations. We suggest that in
discussions of the non-signalling constraint, and of the relationship between signal
transmission, causal influences, and information transfers, this lack of definition is
largely responsible for the articulation of conflicting positions.
1.1 Does Nonlocal Information Transfer Automatically Imply Superluminal
Signalling?
There are many instances in the scientific literature where the concept of informa-
tion transfer is identified directly with the concept of signalling and communication
without justification based upon sound principles. Concepts like ‘hidden signalling’
or ‘hidden communication’ have been employed, for example, in negative assess-
ments of ontological quantum theories, without communication-theoretic definition
of these concepts (e.g., [13–15]). For example, Gallego et al. [15] claimed that “. . .
Bohm’s theory is both deterministic and able to produce all quantum predictions, but
it is incompatible with no-signalling at the level of hidden variables.” Obviously, that
claim contradicts the viewheld by thosewho are in support of the theoretical possibility
of de Broglie–Bohm theory, including the view held by John Bell (e.g., [5–8]). A new
conceptual foundation may be required to be able to move beyond entrenched posi-
tions. We suggest that the conflicting positions can be traced to the singular fact that
contradictory interpretations of the non-signalling theorem have been used: whereas
“axiomatic non-signalling” completely disregards the role of scientific observers, i.e.
of epistemic agents, an “effective non-signalling” constraint, as described, analyzed,
and defined here, takes into account the essential role of epistemic agents in commu-
nication and signalling processes.
Better insight into the difference between concepts like ‘nonlocal influence’ and
‘nonlocal signalling’ is needed also in light of the followingdevelopment:Harrigan and
Spekkens [16] defined the distinction betweenψ-ontic andψ-epistemic approaches to
quantum theory. That distinction sparked a new wave of work drawing attention again
(i) to the question concerning the reality of the quantum state (e.g., [17–20]), and (ii)
to possible contributions ontological theories might make to a future understanding of
quantum theory. For an extensive review and analysis of current developments at this
research frontier see Leifer [21]. Not surprisingly, a key question that has resurfaced
in this context is Bell’s original question as to why superluminal influences cannot
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be used to transmit superluminal signals. For example, Wood and Spekkens [22]
reconsidered the possibility of “quantum causal” explanations, including the problem
of why ψ-ontic quantum theories such as de Broglie–Bohm theory appear to depend
on the strict “fine-tuning” of causal parameters unless such theories are permitted to
violate the non-signalling theorem.
What then is the valid interpretation of the non-signalling theorem? Looking ahead,
the conceptual framework offered by Shannon’s theory of communication processes
allows us to distinguish between two types of signals. That distinction may provide
workers in quantum foundations with a fresh approach towards analysing the differ-
ence between an axiomatic as opposed to an effective non-signalling theorem. The
respective signalswewill identify as (communication-theoretic) ‘Shannon signals’ and
(signal-theoretic) ‘non-Shannon signals’. Summarizing, an axiomatic non-signalling
theoremdenies transmission of Shannon and non-Shannon signals alike. Instead, a the-
orem of effective non-signalling denies only transmission of Shannon signals but does
not prohibit transmission of non-Shannon signals.Wewill next present an overview of
the contrasting uses of the non-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics, employing
as a historical reference the two interpretations used by John Bell.
2 The Two Interpretations by John Bell of the Non-signalling Theorem
The non-signalling theorem is widely agreed to represent a general ‘no-go’ theorem
in quantum mechanics. However, as was mentioned already, there exist two opposing
interpretations of the non-signalling theorem: a foundational interpretation as opposed
to an operational one. As a ‘no-go’ theorem in quantum mechanics, how is the non-
signalling constraint to be validly interpreted?Againwe can turn to Bell for insight and
guidance because, as wewill explain, he employed both interpretations—foundational
and operational—at different times. First, in Sect. 2.1, we will argue that the tradition
of tacitly identifying potential ontic influences or causes with signalling, in the context
of the predictions of Bell’s theorem, started with Bell himself [1]. This is the posi-
tion we have introduced above as “axiomatic non-signalling”. Second, in Sect. 2.2,
we will show that —in years following publication of Bell’s theorem—Bell took up
an explicitly operational interpretation of the non-signalling theorem, an interpreta-
tion that views signals and messages as operationally distinct from either causes or
influences.
2.1 Foundational, Axiomatic Interpretation of the Non-signalling Theorem
In his celebrated paper of 1964, Bell tacitly adopted a foundational (axiomatic) inter-
pretation of non-signalling [1]: “In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum
mechanics to determine the results of individual measurements, without changing the
statistical predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one measur-
ing device can influence the reading of another instrument, however remote.Moreover,
the signal involved must propagate instantaneously, so that such a theory could not
be Lorentz invariant.” Evidently, Bell here takes the fact that “the setting of one
measuring device can influence the reading of another instrument…” as evidence for
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instantaneous, i.e., nonlocal, signalling—“the signal involved must propagate instan-
taneously”. The possibility in a theory of nonlocal, i.e., superluminal, signalling and
communication is in direct conflict, of course, with special relativity, and indeed Bell
notes that “such a theory could not be Lorentz invariant.” However, without further
explanation, Bell [1] directly equates the superluminal influence with a superluminal
signal. We have shown before that loss of operational distinction between ‘influence’
and ‘signal’ is the mark of foundational, ontic, or axiomatic, interpretations—to use
the present terminology—of the non-signalling theorem [23]. There is wide agreement
that the foundational interpretation, i.e., axiomatic non-signalling, is the interpretation
associatedwith orthodoxquantum theory.Before continuingwith the description of the
lesser known, operational interpretation of non-signalling in Sect. 2.2, we will review
briefly how the concept of axiomatic non-signalling has recently been employed as
an apparently conclusive argument against both the possibility of determinism and
nonlocal hidden-variables approaches in quantum mechanics.
2.1.1 Axiomatic Non-signalling as an Argument Against Determinism in Quantum
Mechanics
An axiomatic non-signalling concept was employed in attempts to question the via-
bility of any kind of deterministic approaches to quantum mechanics, challenging
the possibility of de Broglie–Bohm theory for example (e.g., [15,24,25]). We have
previously referred to such attempts as generalizations of Bell’s theorem [23]. The
question concerning determinism has also come up again in the context ofψ-ontic and
ψ-epistemic approaches to quantum theory (e.g., [16,21]): Can the unpredictability
of EPR-type nonlocal correlations count as conclusive evidence in favour of the exis-
tence in nature of objective chance, i.e., of intrinsic randomness? On the one hand, the
objective nature of quantum indeterminism has long been taken for granted and thus
represents a key metaphysical assumption of orthodox quantum theory. On the other
hand, it must be acknowledged that proof of absolute indeterminism is impossible
as a matter of principle—whether by experiments or by mathematical analyses. The
impossibility-of-proof argument was addressed by us before and this argument will
not be restated here (see [23]). In the hope of by-passing these fundamental experimen-
tal and mathematical constraints, it was argued by others that—nevertheless—there
might still be a way to decide between the two competing assumptions: determin-
ism or indeterminism? Specifically, it was claimed that the assumption of (axiomatic)
non-signalling suffices to eliminate the possibility of determinism at the level of the
quantum (e.g., [15,24,25]). In response to that claim, we have noted before that the
possibility of determinism cannot be denied on account of non-signalling because
the claim rests on the independent validity of three interdependent assumptions [23].
Figure 1 illustrates the relational interdependency of the three assumptions that under-
lie the reasoning behind axiomatic non-signalling as a suggested proof of quantum
indeterminism, i.e., of intrinsic randomness, in nature.
We suggest that there does not exist at present a conclusive argument derived froman
axiomatic non-signalling assumptionwhich is capable of the successful generalization
of Bell’s theorem (for details see [23]). A related but not identical argument was
previously offered by Ghirardi and Romano [19]. To repeat, it remains undecidable,
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Fig. 1 Relational diagram illustrating the irreducible interdependency of basic metaphysical assumptions
implicit in standard interpretations of orthodox quantum theory (adapted from [23]). a Free choice assump-
tion, b intrinsic randomness assumption, and c axiomatic non-signalling assumption. Crucially, the validity
of interpreting the non-signalling theorem as an ontic, foundational theorem, or axiom, for quantummechan-
ics, a frequent assumption in standard interpretations, depends on the independent validity of assumptions
(a) and (b). However, neither assumption (a) nor assumption (b) can be independently confirmed if the
possibility of ‘free choice’ depends on the existence of a process that is intrinsically random and vice versa
on the basis of logical considerations alone, which of the opposing metaphysical
positions is valid—indeterminism or determinism (see Fig. 1). In the following, we
will explain that Bell distanced himself from the foundational, axiomatic interpretation
and that he started to adopt an operational approach in line with a theorem of effective
non-signalling [26].
2.2 Operational, Effective Interpretation of the Non-signalling Theorem
In the years following publication of his ground-breaking theorem, Bell introduced
work that recognized and upheld in quantum theory the operational distinction between
‘influences’ or ‘causes’, and ‘signals’ or ‘messages’. Specifically, Bell considered the
concept of potential ontic influences in quantum mechanics, i.e., the concept which
he introduced as ‘beables’ by way of contrast to the standard concept of “observ-
ables”, which refers to (epistemic) states of knowledge only [26]. Significantly, these
(potentially ontic) ‘beables’, he classified into “controllables”, and “uncontrollables”,
whereby he noted that the “latter are no use for sending signals. . .” [26]. Note that
Bell’s distinction between “controllables”, and “uncontrollables” does not inherently
depend on the distinction between nonlocal and local beables, or whether beables
are unpredictably deterministic or intrinsically random. In summary, starting in 1976,
Bell’s own work introduces an operational interpretation of the non-signalling con-
straint, i.e., to use our present terminology, Bell shifts his attention from an axiomatic,
towards an effective, non-signalling concept (e.g., [5–8,26,27]).
Lately, there has been a resurgence of interest in Bell’s own interpretation of his
theorem before and after the year 1976. Wiseman [28,29] recently considered the
idea of “The two Bell’s theorems of John Bell”. The shift in Bell’s own thinking
could be accounted for by a novel perspective on the non-signalling constraint, a view
that is implied by Wiseman’s analysis also [29,30]. We here argue that the transition
from Bell’s position of 1964 [1] to that of 1976 [26] represents a movement towards
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an operational approach which specifically seeks to account for the effective role of
epistemic agency, i.e., agent control based upon agent knowledge, as a key factor
in the construction of the non-signalling constraint (see Sect. 4.2). Again, as was
mentioned already, the agent-based view of non-signalling is well-exemplified by
Bell’s own assertion, that “we cannot use for signalling” the way in which “events at
one place propagate to other places faster than light” [7]. Obviously, Bell’ s new view
of (effective) non-signalling is in stark contrast to his original position of (axiomatic)
non-signalling [1].
Historically, the number has been growing of researchers who have argued—in one
form or another, directly of indirectly—for the validity of an agent-based view of the
non-signalling theorem in line with Bell’s notion of operationally “uncontrollables”
of 1976 (e.g., [3,19,20,23,28–35]). Note that this list is far from complete. What
has been lacking so far, however, is an understanding of the communication-theoretic
difference between axiomatic and effective approaches beyond the statement that agent
participation is presumed in the effective approach. The present work seeks to identify
a decisive technical criterion for defining the difference between “axiomatic non-
signalling” and “effective non-signalling” in the context of communication theory.
2.2.1 An Effective Non-signalling Theorem Accounts for the Controlling Actions of
Epistemic Agents
That Bell saw as indispensable the special role of the experimenter agent in reaching
a full understanding of the non-signalling theorem is amply evident in Bell’s last
published statement on this matter [8]: “Do we then have to fall back on ‘no signalling
faster than light’ as the expression of the fundamental causal structure of contemporary
theoretical physics? This is hard for me to accept. For one thing we have lost the
idea that correlations can be explained, or at least this idea awaits reformulation.
More importantly, the ‘no-signaling. . .’ notion rests on concepts which are desperately
vague, or vaguely applicable. The assertion that ‘we cannot signal faster than light’
immediately provokes the question: Who do we think we are? We who can make
measurements, we who can manipulate ‘external fields’ , we who can signal at all,
even if not faster than light? Do we include chemists, or only physicists, plants, or
only animals, pocket calculators, or only mainframe computers?”. Note, that—by
contrast—the consideration of who or what qualifies as an epistemic agent, or whether
agents may, or may not, access controllably information transfers—plays no role at
all in a theorem describing axiomatic non-signalling. We will return to the concept
of knowledge-based agents in quantum models expressing effective non-signalling in
Sect. 4.2. Next, we will introduce our informational approach for answering Bell’s
quantum-foundational questions regarding the non-signalling notion.
3 An Informational Approach Towards the Concept of Hidden
Superluminal Influences
One major reason as to why many researchers insist on the foundational, or axiomatic,
interpretation of the non-signalling theorem often comes from the following under-
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standing: The presence of hidden superluminal influences would necessarily imply the
presence of (hidden) information transfers which in turn would imply signal transfer
and the possibility of communication. It is a frequent assumption that—via superlumi-
nal information transfers—superluminal signals capable of enabling communication
are necessarily exchanged in any quantum theory that posits superluminal influences
(compare Sect. 1.1). As a consequence, relativity theory would be violated which
would render an ontological quantum theory, like de Broglie–Bohm theory, physically
unrealistic. The analysis provided in Sect. 4 will explore whether or not this under-
standing is justified by definitions of signalling, information transfer, and message
communication, based upon Shannon’s theory of communication processes [11,12].
The ensuing analysis will not only be consistent with the informational approach
towards analysing various consequences of proposed superluminal (causal) influences
but our analysis will strictly rely on that approach to draw its final conclusions.
That is, we assume from the start that “hidden superluminal influences” (e.g., [14]),
and the possibility of nonlocally-causal transfers (e.g., [9,10]), invariably involve
information transfers or exchanges. For example, Bohm and Hiley [31] used the
term “active information” to describe such nonlocal exchanges in the context of
nonlocal hidden-variables approaches. We here take a 1-bit informational event to
be the minimal indication for the occurrence of any kind of causal exchange, or
any discernible physical influence. More precisely, without detection of nonlocally-
correlated informational events—between two space-like separated members of an
entangled pair—evidence for any (potentially ontic) influence between pair members
would be entirely unavailable. Evidently, then, the central question here considered
reduces to this: Must information transfer always imply signalling and communi-
cation? Specifically, how could signal exchanges between two systems be denied
if—at the same time—unrestricted informational exchanges are allowed between
them? Following the detailed communication-theoretic analysis of these questions
in Sect. 4, we will consider the application of the subsequent definitions in the context
of an effective interpretation of the non-signalling theorem for quantum mechanics in
Sect. 5.
4 Information Transfer, Signal Transfer, and Message Communication,
in Reference to Shannon’s Mathematical Theory of Communication
To begin with, we informally define two theorems that are implicit in Shannon’s theo-
retical framework, i.e., theorems that remain unstated usually because they appear to
be self-evident. For the present work, however, we make explicit these theorems by
naming them: (1) a theorem of information transfer control (ITC), and (2) a theorem of
information signification control (ISC). The effective role and application of these the-
orems in the context of constructing an effective non-signalling theorem in relation to
quantum mechanics will be described in Sect. 5. Importantly, these normally implicit
theorems provide the larger operational context without which Shannon’s familiar
explicit theorems and mathematical measures such as Shannon’s source coding the-
orem or Shannon’s channel information capacity, C, could not be usefully applied in
any practical manner [11]. In other words, the normally implicit theorems account for
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the involvement of epistemic agents who originate, encode, send, receive, and decode,
signals. When assessing—in the context of communication theory—the relationship
between the non-signalling theorem, quantum theory, and special relativity,wepropose
that Shannon’s implicit theorems provide a consistent operational framework, because
ITC and ISC theorems account specifically for agent participation during signalling
and communication processes. Subsequent Sect. 4.1 will provide an explanation of
essential differences between (i) Shannon’s operational framework which includes,
for example, agent-dependent encoding/decoding processes as accounted for by the
ISC theorem, and (ii) Shannon’s mathematical framework which is independent of
agent participation.
4.1 Shannon’s Information-Theoretic Approach to Human and Automated
Machine Communication
We next introduce Shannon’s well-known concepts [11]: “The fundamental problem
of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately
a message selected at another point.” For Shannon, any possible communication starts
with an “information source which produces a message or sequence of messages to
be communicated to the receiving terminal”. More precisely, the message to be com-
municated originates with a ‘discrete’ information source. “We can think of a discrete
source”, Shannon [11] explained, “as generating the message, symbol by symbol. It
[the source] will choose successive symbols according to certain probabilities depend-
ing, in general, on preceding choices as well as the particular symbols in question.”
To illustrate the concept of Shannon’s ‘discrete source’ , Fig. 2 shows the scenario
of bidirectional communication of the message “SOS”—in Morse code—between
two sources here represented by sender Alice and receiver Bob. It is apparent that
Shannon’s discrete source for “generating the message”, e.g., Alice in Fig. 2, mani-
fests operational control over the process of signal transmission through the discrete
channel. Shannon defined a ‘discrete channel’ as a “. . . system whereby a sequence
of choices from a finite set of elementary symbols S1, ... , Sn , can be transmitted from
one point to another.” The sequence “• • • − − − • • •” shown in Fig. 2 was chosen
“symbol by symbol” by Shannon’s information source, e.g., epistemic agent Alice,
from the “set of elementary symbols” offered by Morse code (•, −) to communicate
the message “SOS”. The point is that a random sequence of symbols could not—of
course—effectively transmit the message “SOS” between Alice and Bob.
In contrast to the scenario in Fig. 2, which illustrates Shannon’s operational
framework, Shannon’s mathematical framework for describing channel information
capacity, C, is founded upon an entirely different assumption about the properties of an
information source. “How is an information source to be described mathematically”,
Shannon [11] asked, and he introduced the concept of a random source to account
quantitatively for the transmission of any arbitrary message from a set of possible
messages. As was emphasized by Shannon [11], the meaning of an actual message,
and thus of any “successive symbols”, is of no importance in calculating C: “Fre-
quently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated according
to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects
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Fig. 2 Illustration of basic concepts from Shannon’s information-theoretic approach to sender–receiver
systems in human and automated machine communication [11]. For easy overview, we describe key func-
tional elements that operationally define Shannon’ s view of sender-receiver systems, employing his original
definitions [11]: (1) An epistemic agent, here named ‘Alice’ , is the “source which produces a message”, e.g.
the three-letter message “SOS” ; (2) an encoding transmitter “which operates on the message in some way
to produce a signal suitable for transmission” by performing—here in (binary) Morse code—“an encoding
operation which produces a sequence of dots, dashes, and spaces . . . corresponding to the message” ; (3)
a conduit or channel, i.e., “the medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter to receiver” ; (4) a
decoding receiver which “performs the inverse operation of that done by the transmitter, reconstructing
the message from the signal” ; finally (5), an epistemic agent, here named ‘Bob’ , is the destination “for
whom the message is intended”. We label combination of elements (1) and (2), i.e., the epistemic agent and
the transmitter, a “sender” system, or simply the “sender”. Accordingly, we label combination of elements
(4) and (5), i.e., the receiver and the epistemic agent, “receiver system”, or simply the “receiver”. The bi-
directionality of arrows in the figure serves to indicate that the two systems, “sender” and “receiver”, each
may perform the functions of the other leading to the possibility of bidirectional message communication
Fig. 3 The two types of ‘information source’ in Shannon’s communication theory. The type-I source
represents a source of operational control capable of generating an actual message for the purpose of
sender-receiver communication (e.g., see the message “SOS” in Fig. 2). The type-II source represents
a source of random variables, i.e., a “stochastic process” [11], that probabilistically generates the set of
possible messages in the mathematical quantification of channel capacity C
of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem. The significant aspect
is that the actual message is selected from a set of possible messages.” In reference
to Shannon’s distinction between actual message and possible messages, Fig. 3 rep-
resents two different types of ‘information source’ which we have named type-I and
type-II; both types are respectively employed in Shannon’ s model of communication
[11].
The so-called “engineering problem” refers to the mathematical account of chan-
nel information-carrying capacity for theoretically possiblemessages. By contrast, the
problem which is the focus of the present work concerns the operational account of
how an actual message is transmitted from sender to receiver such as the message
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“SOS” in Fig. 2. Importantly, each type of problem—actual message versus possi-
ble messages—elicits different properties of an ‘information source’ as illustrated in
Fig. 3. In Shannon’s operational framework of actual message communication the
participation of epistemic agents who represent type-I sourcesmanifesting operational
control is strictly required (Fig. 3). That is, type-I agents choose—to use Shannon’s
words again—“successive symbols. . . depending, in general, on preceding choices as
well as the particular symbols in question” (compare Fig. 2). It is evident that Shan-
non’s use of the term ‘choice’ does not refer to a random process here. Instead, in the
context of generating an actual message, Shannon’s ‘information source’ represents a
source of operational control (see ‘type-I source’ in Fig. 3 and Sect. 4.2). The corre-
sponding physical signals, i.e., those passing through the channel under type-I agent
control, we from now on will refer to by the new term ‘Shannon signals’ (see Sect. 4.3
for details). Importantly, the above-mentioned ITC and ISC theorems constrain only
the transmission of such Shannon signals, i.e., the signals that deliver actualmessages
(see Sects. 4.3.1 and 4.3.2).
By contrast, for the mathematical description of the “set of possible messages”
Shannon’s information source represents a source of random variables (see ‘type-
II source’ in Fig. 3). The type-II source represents—by Shannon’ s description—a
“stochastic process” for the purpose of producing probabilistically the set of possi-
ble messages in the quantification of channel capacity [11]. Importantly, unlike the
assumptions A and B described in Fig. 1 (see Sect. 2.1.1), the (type-II) source of ran-
dom variables in Shannon’s theory can be deterministic. An example of the physical
instantiation of a type-II source would be the tossing of a fair coin revealing either
‘heads’ or ‘tails’ , which is a process that is deterministic yet operationally unpre-
dictable.
This work focusses on the physical processes that facilitate actual message com-
munication between epistemic agents, e.g., the controlling actions of agents described
by type-I operations (see Fig. 3). It is important to note that there cannot be—in
actuality—‘random messages’ , i.e., random acts of actual communication between
sender and receiver; there could only be random information transfers as will be
explained in detail in Sect. 4.3. Who or what is the epistemic agent in relation to
Shannon’s theory, Bell’s theorem, and the non-signalling constraint?
4.2 Defining the Epistemic Agent
As was mentioned in Sect. 2.2.1, John Bell was keenly aware of the importance in
interpretations of the non-signalling theorem of having an understanding of agency.
Who or what represents an (epistemic) agent? Remember that Bell once askedwhether
we should include in our definition “. . . chemists, or only physicists, plants, or only
animals, pocket calculators, or only mainframe computers?” [8]. We will here intro-
duce a definition that is intended primarily to clarify the meaning of his question, and
that may direct us towards possible answers in the spirit of Bell’s original inquiry.
Agency is generally defined as the capacity of humans or other entities to act in the
world. Put differently, an agent is defined initially by possessing the capacity to influ-
ence causal flows in nature. By prefacing “agent” with the term “epistemic”, attention
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is drawn to the fact that a complete definition of agency represents more than the mere
“capacity to influence causal flows”: an agent possesses knowledge-based, i.e., epis-
temic, capacity for predictably directing, and redirecting, causal flows, and thus for
directing, and redirecting, information flows as well. That is, an epistemic agent holds
the power to (statistically) control physical activity based upon an ability to predict
the outcome of specific actions on targeted processes in reference to a known standard
or goal. In short, an epistemic agent thus manifests in the world a genuine source of
operational control (see Fig. 3). By the definition here introduced, Alice and Bob in
Fig. 2 represent type-I agents who each may plausibly represent and enact in Shan-
non’s sender-receiver system an “information source which produces a message” (see
Fig. 3). It is thus apparent that message communication, in the sense of Shannon’s
communication theory, strictly requires the participation of epistemic type-I agents
who can originate, encode, send, receive, and decode, signals (compare Fig. 3). What
exactly constitutes “signalling”, and “non-signalling”, in the context of the present
communication-theoretic investigation of the non-signalling theorem?
4.3 The Communication-Theoretic Distinction Between Shannon Signals and
Non-Shannon Signals
We have before introduced the new concept of ‘Shannon signal’ in Sect. 4.1. What
exactly constitutes a ‘signal’? Unless one finds agreement first on what represents
a signal, one cannot later expect to have agreement on an appropriate definition of
‘non-signalling’, i.e., negation of signalling. We next distinguish between two types
of signals that are apparent in the context of Shannon’s theory: (1) signals in the
familiar sense of standard signal theory, and (2) signals in the sense of communica-
tion theory only. The latter type of signals we have referred to as “Shannon signals”
whereas the former we will refer to as “non-Shannon signals”. For explanation, the
notion of non-Shannon signal represents a signal in the standard (signal-theoretic)
sense of detecting a physical influence as part of measurement processes in general,
independent of an effective communication task. A simple engineering example is
the manifestation of a “click” by a suitable threshold detector in response to physical
stimulation. However, this is not what is exclusively meant by the term ‘signal’, or
‘signalling’, in the context of Shannon’s communication theory. There, the concept of
signal also refers to the controlled delivery of an informational bit sequence (or, alter-
natively, a single bit of information) which has been subjected to a process ofmessage
encoding (by Shannon’s ‘encoding transmitter’; see Fig. 2). In agreement with that
use in Shannon’s theory, we informally define ‘signal’ in the communication-theoretic
sense as “controllably-transmitted and message-encoded information”. Summarizing,
a non-Shannon signal represents a signal in the well-known sense of standard signal
theory, whereas the newly introduced concept of Shannon signal finds application only
in the communication-theoretic context provided by Shannon’s model.
Next, different communication-theoretic scenarios will be compared to explain fur-
ther the difference between Shannon signals and non-Shannon signals. The scenarios
demonstrate negation of Shannon signal transmission while—at the same time—
allowing transmission of non-Shannon signals, e.g., of uncontrollably-generated
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Fig. 4 Illustration of 9-bit information transfer comparing ‘signalling information transfer’ (a) and ‘non-
signalling information transfer’ (b, c). The boxes to the far right of the figure indicate when is available (+)
or not (–) to epistemic agents Alice and Bob the capacity of ISC (information signification control) or ITC
(information transfer control) in a given scenario (a–c). Question marks shown inside smaller boxes (see b,
c) indicate that—even though perfect informational correlations can be observed and recorded at Alice’s and
Bob’s locations—the communication of the message “SOS” is effectively denied. For example, although
Bob obtains perfect knowledge about the informational state of Alice’s transmitter upon simply observing
the informational state of his receiver, he nevertheless is denied reception of any message from Alice (see
b and c). The examples in b and c demonstrate that the mere fact alone of the availability to Bob and Alice
of informational correlations at their respective locations—as part of some communication system—need
not at all indicate the presence of a message or signal in the communication-theoretic sense. Importantly,
this conclusion is entirely independent of the fact whether the involved information transmission channel
would be represented by a quantum channel or a classical channel. In short, while every signal or message
represents information, not every information represents a message or signal
informational events. Figure 4 illustrates a total of three scenarios (A–C), includ-
ing the standard scenario employed in Shannon’s theory [11] as a reference (Fig. 4a).
Figure 4b and c illustrate the respective applications of the ISC theorem (Sect. 4.3.1)
and the ITC theorem (Sect. 4.3.2).
4.3.1 The Information-Signification-Control (ISC) Theorem
In Shannon’s informationalmodel of signalling processes, any signal sequence is com-
posed of discrete and elementary informational (bit) units [11]. Crucially, single bits
or bit sequences have no meaning “in-themselves”, that is, they do not represent Shan-
non signals or actual messages. Importantly, the process that grants shared meaning,
i.e., shared semantic content, to basic syntactic elements, such as an informational bit
sequence, is known in semiotic theory as ‘signification’ (e.g., [36]).Generally, semiotic
theory studies the relationship between signs and (the process of creating) meaning.
For example, a code represents a rule for connecting signs, e.g., dots and dashes in the
case of Morse code, to their intended meaning. We have introduced “signification”
as a technical term in order to describe accurately the process of assigning meaning
to information by way of encoding and decoding mechanisms that could be shared
between sender and receiver. The concept of ISC makes explicit for Shannon’s model
the normally implicit theorem that operationally accounts for encoding and decod-
ing processes (see also Introduction to Sect. 4). For example, Fig. 4a and b portray
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identical informational patterns. However, only for the standard scenario discussed by
Shannon, the 9-bit pattern represents a Shannon signal (i.e., here the signal which—in
Morse code—conveys the message “SOS” ; see Fig. 4a). Conversely, the structurally-
identical 9-bit pattern, shown as part of the second scenario in Fig. 4b, represents a
non-Shannon signal. The difference between the two scenarios is explained by the
presence (Fig. 4a) or absence (Fig. 4b) of operational control by epistemic agents over
encoding-decoding processes, as accounted for by the ISC theorem. Put simply, epis-
temic agents Bob and Alice do not know Morse code in this example and they cannot
therefore exchange actual messages using this coding system. The crucial point is the
following: whereas Shannon’s standard scenario represents information transfer that
is signalling (Fig. 4a), the scenario illustrated in Fig. 4b represents the case where
the transfer of information is non-signalling in Shannon’s communication-theoretic
sense. That is, (two-way) transfers of Shannon signals are denied until Alice and Bob
each acquires operational control over the process which we refer to as signification.
4.3.2 The Information-Transfer-Control (ITC) Theorem
To review the above, in the scenario in Fig. 4b, unlike in the standard scenario in
Fig. 4a, operational control was absent by Bob and Alice over ISC (e.g., code or key
sharing). By contrast, Fig. 4c illustrates the opposite scenario: control over informa-
tion signification is available, whereas control over information transfers through the
transmission channel is not, even on a statistical basis only (compare boxes to the right
of Fig. 4b and c). To illustrate this scenario when agents Bob and Alice lack the power
to control information transfers, the sequence “• • − • − • • − •” is shown as one
possible, unpredictably transmitted informational pattern. This pattern represents, of
course, the appearance of non-Shannon signals only, to apply the present terminology
(Fig. 4c); naturally, any other informational bit sequence pattern could have also been
selected instead to visualize the statistical uncontrollability of information transmis-
sion. Note also that uncontrollable processes may accidentally generate the pattern
“•••−−−•••” shown in Fig. 4b, and may thus potentially transmit a false-positive
“signal” between Alice and Bob. In summary, the ITC theorem represents the nega-
tion of operational control by epistemic agents over information transmission (see also
Introduction to Sect. 4).
5 Two Sub-theorems Represent an Effective Non-signalling Theorem
Why is the identification misleading of “hidden signalling”, “hidden messages”, or
“hidden communication”,with the concept of “hidden information transfer”, for exam-
ple, in the context of de Broglie–Bohm theory? To answer that question, we next
employ key findings from the previous section in the task of defining the non-signalling
theorem as an effective instead of as an axiomatic theorem. Again, the effective view
represents the negation of operational control by epistemic type-I agents (see Fig. 3). In
accordance with the above communication-theoretic analysis, the complete negation
of operational control includes two distinct aspects: (i) negation of ITC (see Fig. 4c),
and (ii) negation of ISC (see Fig. 4b). Simply on that basis, we distinguish between
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two sub-theorems that jointly represent an effective non-signalling theorem, and we
introduce them as: (1) Non-transfer-control (NTC) theorem (i.e., negation of ITC), and
(2) Non-signification-control (NSC) theorem (i.e., negation of ISC). Importantly, in
light of the hypothesis of quantum channels for instant information transmission, e.g.,
as postulated in de Broglie–Bohm theory, the following is obvious: while the NSC the-
orem must be theoretically accounted for in any complete description of an effective
non-signalling theorem (compare Fig. 4b), it is immediately apparent also that sender
and receiver could, in principle, share knowledge about any arbitrary coding system
with each other; however, only classical channels could be used for that purpose.
Concerning the NTC theorem, operational uncontrollability of information transmis-
sion via hypothetical quantum channels assures that nonlocal information transfers are
entirely non-signalling—in the sense of denial of (communication-theoretic) Shannon
signalling.
To repeat, NTC and NSC theorems negate Shannon signalling, i.e., actual mes-
sage transfers, but they do not interfere with the transmission of non-Shannon
signals (for definitions see Sect. 4.3). To show that negation only of Shannon sig-
nalling, but not negation of non-Shannon signal transfer, is the relevant concept
for constructing an effective non-signalling constraint, the following comparison
may advance insight: Evidently, the non-signalling theorem was not introduced
to prohibit the manifestation by quantum detectors—in EPR-type experiments—of
(nonlocally-correlated) measurement clicks that reveal informational correlations at
space-like distances (e.g., [37–42]). Instead, we maintain that the non-signalling theo-
rem was introduced to prevent the possibility of the instant, i.e., superluminal, transfer
of message-encoded information through the controlled use—by a sender-receiver
pair—of informationally-correlated detector clicks. While it is certainly true that
each individual click represents a signal also in the ordinary signal-theoretic sense
(i.e., in the sense of a non-Shannon signal as defined in Sect. 4.3), the detection
of a click need not at all indicate the presence of a signal as defined in terms of
“controllably-transmitted and message-encoded information”, i.e., in the sense of the
communication-theoretic definition of (Shannon) signal. Consequently, it would be
wrong—both in the context of Shannon’s theory and the non-signalling theorem—to
use as synonyms ‘information’ and ‘signal’ , and thus to simply identify information
transmission with signal transmission and communication (see also legend to Fig. 4).
In summary, of the two sub-theorems of an effective non-signalling theorem—NTC
theorem and NSC theorem—each one represents a theorem about the negation of
‘operational control’ (see Sects. 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Operational uncontrollability of
potentially ontic influences, i.e., ‘beables’, Bell [26] took as the primary justification
for adopting an effective non-signalling theorem, instead of an axiomatic one [1]. Fig-
ure 5 provides a summary (i) of the two contrasting interpretations by John Bell of
the non-signalling theorem and (ii) of our communication-theoretic criterion which
accounts for the difference between Bell’s original position of 1964 [1] and his later
position which he first introduced in 1976 [26].
This workmay represent an important step towards answering Bell’s pressing ques-
tions which were motivated by his sceptical assessment that “. . . the ‘no-signaling. . .’
notion rests on concepts which are desperately vague, or vaguely applicable” [8]. The
present analysis sought to clarify the concepts in question, including of the ‘role of us’
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Fig. 5 The two interpretations by John Bell of the non-signalling theorem (for details see Sect. 2). To
the left of the figure are represented the two contrasting interpretations of the non-signalling theorem—
the foundational, axiomatic position of 1964 [1] and the operational, effective position of 1976 [26]. To
the right of the figure is summarized the communication-theoretic criterion which technically defines the
difference between “axiomatic non-signalling” and “effective non-signalling”, in accord with the present
analysis. The boxes at the top (“YES” and “YES” ) indicate that “axiomatic non-signalling” eliminates
the distinction between Shannon and non-Shannon signal transfer and thus ignores any generative role
for epistemic agents in the establishment of signalling events in the communication-theoretic sense. The
boxes at the bottom (“YES” and “NO” ) indicate that “effective non-signalling”, by contrast, maintains
the communication-theoretic difference between the respective signals: an effective non-signalling theorem
prohibits only the (type-I agent-controlled) transfer of Shannon signals but does not prohibit the transfer of
non-Shannon signals which is independent of type-I agent control (compare Fig. 3)
—scientific observers and epistemic agents in general—as part of the non-signalling
notion, with the following result: We are the agents who can manifest control over (i)
information transfers as well as (ii) information signification but only to the extent that
we are granted access to informational pathways and to shared symbolic representa-
tion (see also legends to Figs. 4, 5). Figure 5 illustrates the fact that the foundational,
axiomatic interpretation eliminates the distinction between Shannon and non-Shannon
signals. Consequently, the axiomatic position on non-signalling fails to address Bell’s
urgent questions such as about scientific observers “who can signal at all, even if
not faster than light?” [8]. An effective interpretation, by contrast, acknowledges the
pivotal difference between the respective signals, leading to the possibility of devel-
oping a communication-theoretic account of agent participation during signalling and
non-signallingprocesses: an effective non-signalling theoremonly limits (type-I agent-
controlled) transmission of Shannon signals but does not prohibit transmission of
non-Shannon signals (see Fig. 5).
Finally, having in hand now a single criterion for the consistent differentia-
tion between axiomatic non-signalling and effective non-signalling, questions to be
explored in future work include the following: Does the proposition of nonlocal infor-
mation transfer automatically entail a space-time (metric) structure that ceases to be
Lorentz invariant? Does the possibility of superluminal information transfer com-
promise special relativity, even though the possibility of superluminal signalling and
communication, by way of instantaneous, i.e., nonlocal transfers, is fully denied? In
other words, is it inevitable that causal paradoxes are generated automatically—as a
function of nonlocal quantum information transfers—even in the complete absence
of experimenter agents and of their laboratory devices, i.e., if nature is left to herself ?
The subsequent discussion is intended to provide an initial orientation for such work.
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6 Discussion
The present analysis has identified minimal conditions for an operational non-
signalling theorem, i.e., a theorem that allows for the possibility of nonlocal quantum
information transfer, yet one that effectively denies superluminal signalling and com-
munication. Our findings may facilitate the translation of ideas and concepts – in the
context of quantum-entangled information—between uncontrollability of nonlocal
influences and the observation of nonlocal informational events in EPR-type experi-
ments. Furthermore, this work may prove useful for assessing Bell’s original notion of
“uncontrollables” within the scope of more recent physical, metaphysical, and epis-
temological interpretations of quantum information and entanglement (e.g., [43,44]).
For this discussion the focus will be on three questions, each of which highlights a spe-
cific research challenge when interpreting the wave function ψ as a reality, including
in nonlocal hidden-variables theories.
6.1 What is the Physical Meaning of the Term “Hidden” in the Context of
Hidden-Variables Theories?
What is “hidden” about ‘hidden variables’? “The usual nomenclature, hidden vari-
ables, is most unfortunate”, Bell [45] complained in a note, and he proposed that
“Perhaps uncontrolled variable would have been better, for these variables, by hypoth-
esis, for the time being, cannot be manipulated at will by us.” If one accepts Bell’s
proposal that hidden variables represent uncontrollable variables, i.e., variables that
“cannot be manipulated at will by us”, then much of the mystery is lifted surrounding
the term “hidden” : the variables are called “hidden” because they are uncontrollable
for any pragmatic purposes, such as for sender-receiver communication. However,
the determinism in Bohm’s theory, should it not imply statistical predictability and
control? The false habit of identifying determinism with predictability stems from
an idealized view of physical systems as fundamentally linearly-behaving systems:
If one knows the initial state of a system then one can predict its evolution towards
the final state. However, if there is involved only the weakest element of nonlinearity
in a deterministic system, such as is the case with sensitive dependencies on initial
state conditions, then final state prediction may quickly become impossible (e.g., see
deterministic chaos in emergent dynamics). For explanation, even the best nonlinear
control and prediction techniques, whether applied to emergent, self-organizing states
in physical, chemical, or living systems, are successful only in very limited nonlinear
regimes due to the prohibitive complexity of multi-factorial, randomizing interactions
(e.g., [46]). “Consider the extreme case of a ‘random’ generator”, Bell [27] explained,
“. . . which is in fact perfectly deterministic in nature—and, for simplicity, perfectly
isolated. In such a device the complete final state perfectly determines the complete
initial state—nothing is forgotten. And yet for many purposes, such a device is pre-
cisely a ‘forgetting machine’. A particular output is the result of combining so many
factors, of such a lengthy and complicated dynamical chain, that it is quite extraor-
dinarily sensitive to minute variations of any one of many initial conditions. It is the
familiar paradox of classical statistical mechanics that such exquisite sensitivity to
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initial conditions is practically equivalent to complete forgetfulness of them.” In de
Broglie–Bohm theory, just as Bell [27] had suggested with his thought experiment
of the “forgetting machine”, the operational impossibility to predict and control indi-
vidual quantum correlations derives from the impossibility to know—with arbitrary
precision—initial state configurations of the nonlinearly-behaving, yet fully deter-
ministic, (sub)quantum system (e.g., [31,32]). In fact, from the vantage point of an
effective non-signalling constraint, the ‘hidden variables’ associated with the notion
of superluminal hidden influences represent ‘non-signalling variables’ in the here
introduced communication-theoretic sense of (Shannon) non-signalling (see Fig. 4).
6.2 Does Nonlocal Information Transfer Nevertheless Violate Relativity Theory
Despite the Fact that the Information is Non-signalling in the
Communication-Theoretic Sense?
“Does superluminal information transmission automatically violate relativity theory?”
asked Maudlin [35]. An affirmative answer is often assumed tacitly by researchers
who are committed to the standard, axiomatic view of the non-signalling condition.
However, Maudlin’s extensive analysis reveals a more complex picture. He concludes
that—by itself—the possibility of superluminal information transmission “need not
give rise to causal paradox, if the information is not available for general use.” Specif-
ically, his analysis finds that the generation of causal paradoxes is the consequence
of the possibility of “signal loops and where causal processes cannot be used to send
signals paradoxes cannot arise.” By our definition, Maudlin [35] here refers to the
formation of Shannon-signal loops, and if their formation is denied, then causal para-
doxes cannot occur. An effective non-signalling theorem, as offered in the present
study, denies Shannon signalling and therefore negates Shannon-signal loops from
being formed (see Figs. 4, 5). Consequenty, the standard assumption may be in need
of revision that a quantum theory must be unphysical, e.g., in violation of special
relativity, simply because it allows for the possibility of nonlocal information trans-
fer. We here suggest that the effective, operational position on non-signalling may
negate the presumed inevitability of paradoxical consequences in association with
quantum theories positing nonlocal information transfer. However, in regards to the
notion of nonlocal, i.e., superluminal, influences is it acceptable to invoke terms such
as ‘transfer’ or ‘transmission’ ?
6.3 What Justifies the Use of Terms Like ‘Transfer’ or ‘Transmission’ in
Relation to the Concept of Nonlocal Quantum Information?
In what sense is it acceptable to speak of ‘transfer’ or ‘transmission’ in the context of
instantaneous influences? “To speak of instantaneous travel from X to Y is a mixed
or incoherent metaphor”, van Fraassen [47] pointed out, “. . . for the entity in question
is implied to be simultaneously at X and at Y—in which case there is no need for
travel, for it is at its destination already.” We agree with van Fraassen’s assessment
that—in the context of quantum nonlocality—the use of terms such as travel, transfer,
propagation, or transmission, is logically incoherent.However, for the present studywe
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have retained the use of such terms for historical reasons, and for reasons of scientific
convention. That is, in relation to the notion of ‘instantaneous influences’ , instances
of “mixed or incoherent metaphor” abound in the literature on quantum foundations
such as, to name only two examples, “propagation with infinite velocity” [8] or “non-
local information transferral” [48]. Of course, these authors were fully aware of the
mixed status of such expressions, but alternative terms are unavailable—even now—
that have standard use. To remedy the inconsistency, van Fraassen [47] proposed that
“. . . one should say instead that the entity has two (or more) coexisting parts, that it is
spatially extended.” That proposition is also in line with an intuitive characterization
of Reichenbach’s principle of ‘common cause’ [49]. However, important theoretical
obstacles remain in place there also as discussed by Cavalcanti and Lal [50].
Following van Fraassen [47], the entity of ‘nonlocal quantum information’ should
be described as information which exists—at space-like separated locations—in “two
. . . coexisting parts” or as being “spatially extended”. Even so, would the use of
a more accurate description of the nonlocal entity alter in any way the findings of
the present study? Our conclusions would remain as valid as before, because our
analysis is indifferent to whether one views nonlocal information as a function of
instant transmission, Reichenbach’s ‘common causation’ , or van Fraassens’s ‘spatial
extension’. Significantly, an effective non-signalling theorem would be violated under
the following condition: not only the entity of ‘information’would have to be “spatially
extended”, or be manifested instantly by “two . . . coexisting parts”, but—similarly—
the entity of the ‘message’ as well. However, as was illustrated in Fig. 4b and c, there
exists no such necessary link between the presence of information and the presence
of a message. In short, ‘nonlocal information’ does not automatically equal ‘nonlocal
communication’ (see legend to Fig. 4). Future work might construct and use more
appropriate terminology, yet the present conclusions do not depend on this.
6.4 Conclusions
This communication-theoretic study has demonstrated that an effective non-signalling
theorem allows for nonlocal quantum information transfer yet—at the same time—
effectively denies superluminal signalling and communication. While this study has
addressed key points, the exploration of novel possibilities has just begun. Every-
one agrees that no final judgement can yet be delivered concerning the compatibility
between, for example, non-relativistic de Broglie–Bohm theory, and the theory of
special relativity. Nevertheless, while there might still possibly exist reasons for why
nonlocal information transfer may represent a physically-unrealistic proposition for
quantum mechanics, we have shown that the danger of superluminal signalling and
communication is not one of them.
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